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I. INTRODUCTION
T HERE IS a crisis occurring in the skies over the United
States, and indeed, the world. Cheaper air travel has re-
*J.D. Candidate, May 2001, Southern Methodist University School of Law;
B.B.A./M.P.A., University of Texas at Austin, 1996. Following graduation, the
author will join the law firm of Baker Batts, L.L.P., in Dallas, Texas.
** Winner, First Annual Wayne Vines Memorial Scholarship for Aviation
Safety.
857
858 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [65
sulted in a record number of air passengers,I which has in turn
led to cramped conditions on board airplanes and poor treat-
ment by airline employees. 2 As a consequence, airlines are re-
porting dramatic increases in the number of incidents involving
unruly passengers-from verbal assaults to horrific violence.'
Many airlines have responded to this increase in violence,
known as "air rage,"4 by not only filing criminal charges through
state and federal criminal systems,5 but also by banning violent
passengers from ever flying again.' In fact, an industrywide ban
I See Suzi T. Collins &John Scott Hoff, In-Flight Incivility Today: The Unruly Pas-
senger, 12 AIR AND SPACE LAw. 1 (1998); U.S. FAA Annual Aviation Forecast Predicts
Increase in Air Travel Demand, AIRLINE INDUSTRY INFO., Mar. 26, 1999.
See Joanna Weiss, American Airlines Passenger Left Window Seat, Landed in Jail,
BOSTON GiLoBw, August 1, 1999; see also 145 CONG. REC. S1325 (1999) (reporting
a statement by Sen. Wyden to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation: "[W]hen people are treated like so many pieces of cargo, it's not
surprising that some of them will lash out."). Congress has been considering a
Passenger Bill of Rights (Airline Passenger Fairness Act) to try to alleviate the
poor traveling conditions that many passengers face, and hopefully reduce inci-
dents of air rage. See id.
: See, e.g., Dan Reed, The Latest Rage; Airlines are taking tough steps as they report
seeing more passengers flying off hand, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, August 15,
1999, a t B1; Laura Brown, Fla. man arrested at Logan in 'air rage' incident, BOSTON
HERALD, August 14, 1999, at 5; Carolyn Kleiner, Coffee, tea, or a jail term?, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, November 16, 1998, at 81.
"Air rage" defined:
The term air rage has been coined to describe conduct occurring
during air travel, which can fall anywhere on a behavioral contin-
uum from socially offensive to criminal. Air rage describes inten-
tional acts that are highly disproportionate to motivating factors,
which endanger the flight crew and/or other passengers and po-
tentially jeopardize the safety of the aircraft itself.
Nancy Lee Firak and Kimberly A. Schmaltz, Air Rage: Choice of Law for Intentional
Torts Occurring in Flight Over International Waters, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1, 7 (1999). Air
rage is also sometimes referred to as "sky rage" or "cabin fever." [d. at 8.
5 Specifically, the Federal Aviation Act makes it a criminal offense for a person
to assault or intimidate a member of the flight crew in a way that interferes with
his or her ability to perform his or her duties. See 49 U.S.C. § 46504.
See, e.g., Controlling Unruly Fliers: Airlines Consider Blacklisting Troublemakers,
USA TODAV TRAVEL GUIDE (Nov. 3, 1998) <http://wwv.usatolay.com/life/
travel/lIbsiness/t103uf.htm>; Julia Malone, Airlines Faulted for Not Resolving
Problems Before Passenger Rage Erupts, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, August 18,
1999. Interestingly, U.S. airlines acknowledge privately that blacklisting could
lead to legal problems, but neither they nor their trade association will comment
publicly on the matter. See Controlling Unruly Fliers: Airlines Consider Blacklisting
Troublemakers, USA TODAV TRAVE[L GUIDE (Nov. 3, 1998) <http://www.usatoday.
corn/life/travel/business/ti 1 03uf.htm>.
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on passengers identified as unruly has even been proposed by
the Secretary of Transportation.7
This comment will analyze the legal implications of outright
bans instituted by airlines. The comment will begin with Section
II identifying the problem now being faced in the sky. Section
III will address the constitutional right to travel and how it af-
fects bans on air travel. Section IV will consider specific provi-
sions of the Federal Aviation Act and the requirements it
imposes on airlines regarding denial of passage. Finally, Section
V will discuss common carrier responsibilities and how they
weigh into the picture.
II. THE PROBLEM OF UNRULY PASSENGERS
A. How BAD Is THE PROBLEM?
The problem of unruly passengers on airlines has received
much attention in the general news media recently. The exam-
ples range from the mildly amusing to the truly outrageous:
A woman got into an argument with an American Airlines
flight attendant about getting around the meal cart in the mid-
dle of the aisle in order to get back to her seat. The woman
used "the f-word" and was subsequently banned from all future
American Airlines flights.8
A 200-pound college football player on a cross-country US Air-
ways flight began suffering delusions that he was Jesus Christ
and attempted to enter the cockpit so that he could bless the
pilots. In his attempt to get to the cockpit, he shoved one flight
attendant to the floor and flung another across three seats, caus-
ing her to suffer internal bleeding, kidney and bladder trauma,
spinal trauma, and bruises on her back and stomach. Three
male passengers, who finally subdued the unruly passenger by
tying him up, sustained bite wounds and cuts.'
An inebriated businessman on a United Airlines flight, when
refused another drink, pulled down his pants and defecated on
a food cart. "
A man on a Delta Airlines flight from Atlanta to England be-
came enraged after a flight attendant determined that he had
had enough to drink and refused to serve him. The passenger,
7 See Reed, supra note 3.
8 See Weiss, supra note 2.
1) See Elliot Neal Hester, Flying in the Age of Air Rage, SALON TRAVEL (Sept. 7,
1999) <h ttp: / /www.salon.com / travel/ diary/ hest/ 1999/09/0 7 / rage/>.
10 See Collins & Hoff, supra note 1, at 21.
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who was nearly six-and-a-half feet tall, attacked two flight attend-
ants, injuring one so severely that she could not return to work
for months. "
A flight attendant and three crewmembers were injured when
a female passenger became enraged when the flight attendant
refused to serve her another sandwich.' 2
Two passengers on a Continental Airlines flight barged into
the first-class cabin, tried to force open the door to the cockpit,
and poured a pot of hot coffee over a flight attendant.'"
A drunk passenger on a U.S. Air flight assaulted a flight at-
tendant because she refused to serve him another drink. The
passenger threatened to open the door and throw the flight at-
tendant out of the airplane.' 4
Beyond the anecdotal evidence are telling statistics that illus-
trate the story just as vividly. In 1991 the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) investigated 141 cases involving interference
with airlines employees.' 5 In 1997 that number jumped to 284
investigations,' 6 and those statistics seem to understate the
problem.
Problems on American Airlines have more than tripled since
1994, to 921 incidents in 1997.17 Shelley Longmuir, Vice Presi-
dent of Government Affairs for United Airlines, testified before
the House Subcommittee on Aviation that United alone had ap-
proximately 450 incidents involving unruly passengers in 1997.18
Further, the Air Transport Association, the trade association for
the major U.S. airlines, estimates that there were several thou-
' I See Reed, supra note 3.
2 See Collins & Hoff, supra note 1, at 21.
13 See Woman Gets 2 Years for Belligerence on Airliner, Los ANGELES TIMES,June 30,
1998, at B4.
14 See Collins & Hoff, supra note 1, at 21. This list of examples here is by no
means exhaustive. See Collins & Hoff, supra note 1, at 21, for many more exam-
ples, some even more egregious than the ones listed here. See also B.J. Siges-
mund, Attacks Have Airlines Angry, NEWSWEEK.COM (Nov. 7, 1998) <http://www.
dailydavos.com/nw-srv/issue/19_98b/tnw/today/ps/psOlfrl.htm>.
15 See Andy Sher, Frist Sponsors Unruly Airline Passengers Bill, CIIATIANOOGA
TIMES/CAI-r-ANOOGA FREE PRESS, May 30, 1999, at B7.
16 See id.
17 See Seeing Red Over Air Rage (Mounting crackdown on unruly passengers), CON-
SUMER REi. TRAVEL LES-rER, Feb. 1999, at 15. According to a spokesman for
American Airlines, "It is increasing, and our attention to it is certainly increas-
ing." Reed, supra note 3.
18 Problem Airline Passengers; Limiting Cary-on Baggage Before the Subcomm. On Avi-
ation (June 11, 1998) (statement of Shelley Longmuir, Vice President of Govern-
ment Affairs for United Airlines, Inc.).
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sand incidents involving unruly passengers on major U.S. air-
lines in 1997.19
The problem of unruly passengers has even become so great
that Lloyds of London has created an insurance policy to pro-
vide coverage to airlines for the costs of air rage incidents, such
as having to divert aircraft to other airports and compensating
employees and passengers for injuries and economic losses
stemming from the incidents.2 1
B. REACTION By THE AIRLINES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The source of this increase in problems in the sky is the sub-
ject of much discussion. It seems that each group has its own
agenda and, consequently, points a finger at a different prob-
lem. For instance, a former airline executive who is now the
president of the International Airline Passengers Association
blames the problem on unions, saying that unionized flight at-
tendants don't take pride in their work, looking at it as 'just a
job" due to the fact that they have "union protection. 21
Mothers Against Drunk Drivers places the blame squarely on air-
line alcohol policies. 22 At the same time, some take the view
that airlines are inflating the whole problem of air rage in order
to divert attention away from the lack of service and crowded
conditions on airplanes today.23 Some people at the airlines
even point to themselves. For example, a captain at a major
U.S. airline says: "What's happening is the industry's own fault.
We've got to treat passengers with respect. We've made air travel
a very unpleasant experience. It's a service industry, but airlines
are trying to make passengers airline-compliant, when they
i9 See Seeing Red Over Air Rage, supra note 17. In Britain, air rage incidents that
resulted in arrest more than doubled from 1998 to 1999. See Mark Hodson, Bus-
ier Skies Are Safer, SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 30, 2000. Airlines and airports
are in a quandary, though. While they need to highlight the incidents that do
occur in order to get support for action by the government, they risk scaring off
passengers if the public begins to identify a particular airline or airport as espe-
cially dangerous. See, e.g., J.M. Lawrence, Teen Charged with Being Unruly on Hub-
N.Y. Jet, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 13, 1999, at 19 (reporting four air rage arrests in
three weeks at Boston's Logan Airport, but noting that airport officials emphasize
the tens of millions of passengers flying from Logan each year and the rarity of
air rage incidents at the airport).
20 See Carolyn Aldred, Airlines Looking At Ways to Quell Air Rage Risks, BUSINESS
INSURANCE, Jan. 3, 2000, at 17.
21 SeeJulie Carr Smyth, Air Rage-A Real Threat or Smoke Screen For the Airlines?,
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should be making the airline passenger-compliant. ' 24 Psycholo-
gist Nathan Pollack suggests that the powerlessness that people
experience in their work leads to dangerous frustration.2 5 And
interestingly, some have even pointed to a lack of oxygen as the
culprit.2
6
Whatever the cause may be, this rise in unruly behavior has
led to actions by the airlines and law enforcement authorities.
Federal regulations prohibit a person from "assault[ing],
threaten[ing], intimidat[ing], or interfere[ing] with a
crewmember in the performance of the crewmember's duties
aboard an aircraft ..... 27
Stiff penalties already exist for problem passengers. 8 Passen-
gers who engage in unruly behavior can be imprisoned for up to
20 years and receive fines of up to $250,000.29) Unruly passen-
gers are also being made to reimburse airlines for extra costs
incurred due to unruly incidents, such as the costs associated
with making unscheduled stops in order to deplane unruly pas-
sengers.3 ' These costs can sometimes be exorbitant, though, so
collecting anything can be costly to the airlines as well. In Ca-
nada, unruly passengers who endanger the safety of a flight can
be sentenced to life imprisonment.3'
In addition, the airline industry is working closely with the
federal government to combat the problem. Efforts are under-
way "to elevate the priority of aviation crimes, particularly with
respect to prosecuting passengers that interfere with crew mem-
bers. '32 Airlines are working with the Department of Justice to
coordinate federal, state, and local government responses to in-
2!4 See Francis Fiorino, Passengers Who Cany 'Surly Bonds of Earth' Aloft, AVIArION
WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 28, 1998, at 123.
25 See Phone Calls and Driving Don't Mix, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 3, 2000.
26 See Are Unruly Passengers Oxygen-Deprived?, AIR SAFETY WEEK, Nov. 22, 1999.
27 14 C.F.R. § 121.580 (1999).
28 One passenger, it seems, received the stiffest penalty of all after punching a
pilot and trying to choke a flight attendant. A doctor on board the flight injected
this unruly passenger with a tranquilizer. The passenger died shortly thereafter,
due to the tranquilizer reacting with other drugs or alcohol that the man had
been taking. See Passenger Injected with Tranquilizers Dies on Airplane, Sr. Louis
POs-T-DIsPATrCu, Dec. 6, 1998, at B7.
29) See Benjamin Pimentel, New Federal Campaign Concentrates on Drunk Airline
Passengers, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Nov. 18, 1997, at A22; see also Kleiner, supra
note 3.
o See Kleiner, supra note 3.
:' See Battles in the Sky Under Discussion Committee Looks at Ways to Combat Air
Rage, EDMONTON SuN, Jan. 17, 2000, at 15.
32 See Problem Airline Passengers, supra note 18.
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cidents and to compile a prosecution manual that will discuss
and speed up prosecution of these incidents." Furthermore,
American Airlines has begun issuing written notices to unruly
passengers, warning them that they may be in violation of fed-
eral law and directing them to cease their behavior
immediately. 4
Beyond these penalties, some airlines have resorted to ban-
ning unruly passengers from future flights.3 British Airways
and Virgin Atlantic Airways are advocating a system that would
create a worldwide blacklist, banning unruly passengers from fu-
ture flights.3 6 In the United States, United's Vice-President for
Government Affairs said as much while testifying to Congress:
"[L]et me be very clear: United intends to see that abusive pas-
sengers who remain a threat to employees or fellow passengers
are prohibited from flying United... [T] hey are no longer wel-
come on our airline. 37
Other airlines are following suit. For example, American Air-
lines petitioned the U.S. Attorney General's Office and the De-
partment of Transportation to prosecute unruly passengers."'
American spokesman John Hotard said: "The customer is not
always right, and there are some we do not want on our
airplanes.""9
Northwest Airlines, in instituting a ban against one man who
assaulted a pilot at a ticket counter, informed other airlines of
33 See id.
34 See Seeing Red Over Air Rage, supra note 17. "The process is similar to a soccer
referee handing a 'yellow card' to a player, warning that one more infraction will
lead to disqualification." Reed, supra note 3. On international flights (but not
domestic ones), the pilot of the airplane has the right to lock unruly passengers
in the lavatory until the plane lands. See Steven A. Mirmina, Aviation Safety and
Security - Legal Developments, 63J. AIR L. & COM. 547, 561 (1998).
35 See Lee Rood, Rage Takes to the Skies: Passengers and Airlines Get Ugly with Each
Other, DES MOINES REGISTER, Aug. 1, 1999, at 1.
36 See World News Roundup, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TEac., Nov. 9, 1998, at 31; see
also Airlines May Blacklist Violent Passengers For Life, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1998, at C3.
This blacklisting does not seem to be working, however. See Richard Thomas,
How We Broke Branson's 'Air Rage' Ban, OBSERVER, Nov. 15, 1998, at 12.
37 See Problem Airline Passengers, supra note 18.
38 See Seeing Red Over Air Rage, supra note 17.
39 Id.; see also Weiss, supra note 2 (reporting American's lifetime ban of a pas-
senger due to her using expletives toward a flight attendant); Malone, supra note
6 (quoting an American Airlines spokesman acknowledging American's imposi-
tion of lifetime bans on unruly passengers).
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its actions against the man.4" Continental Airlines banned a pas-
senger who attacked and broke the neck of a gate agent in New-
ark, and Continental's CEO has expressed a desire that the
passenger never be allowed to fly on any airline again.4'
The federal government is getting in on the action as well.
Legislation was introduced in late spring of 1999 to institute a
one-year ban on unruly passengers, which will be imposed by
the Secretary of Transportation.42 Some have suggested that the
ban be forever.4" This comment focuses on the legal implica-
tions of such bans.
4 See Collins & Hoff, supra note 1, at 23. By November 1998, Northwest had
banned three passengers for punching people. See Controlling Unruly Fliers, supra
note 6.
Si See Unruly Passengers Challenge Airlines, AvIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 25,
1999, at 60.
42 See S. 1139, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing the one year ban and providing
for a $25,000 fine to airlines if they provide travel to a banned passenger); see also
Sher, supra note 15; Richard Powelson, Fiist Chalked Up String of Small Victories,
KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Jan. 9, 2000, at H2 (noting the bipartisan effort of
Sen. Bill Frist of Tennessee and Sen. Harry Reid of Nevada to impose air travel
bans on unruly passengers). In the words of Sen. Reid:
We need not only to punish passengers who threaten the safety of
[other] passengers. We also need to give airlines the power to pre-
vent particularly violent or disruptive passengers from committing
similar acts in the future. When someone drives in an unsafe man-
ner on our roads, local police have the power to fine them. When
that someone commits the same offenses repeatedly, or drives in a
way that is especially dangerous, local authorities have the power to
revoke or suspend their driver's licenses-to take those drivers off
the road. I think we need to do something similar with air travelers
who commit particularly dangerous acts, or who insist on repeat-
edly disrupting airline flight crews, We need them off of our air-
lines, so that they do not have the opportunity to jeopardize the
lives of other passengers in the future.... When we ... get.., on
an airplane, we should be able to sit back and relax, confident in
the knowledge that [airline personnel] can perform the jobs they
were trained to do without interference by unreasonable or violent
passengers. We should also be able to board an airline secure in
the knowledge that the man or woman sitting in the seat next to us,
doesn't have an extensive history of violent or disruptive behavior
on airplanes. We should also have the security of knowing that if a
passenger does choose to commit a particularly unruly or violent
act that threatens the safety of other passengers or the flight crew,
that passenger won't be able to get on another airplane tomorrow
and do the same thing to another unsuspecting planeload of
passengers.
145 CONG. REC. S 6050 (daily ed. May 26, 1999) (statement of Sen. Reid).
43 See Reed, supra note 3. "If enacted, such a ban would amount to blacklisting
people who have lost control in the air or at airports." Id.
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL
A. HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RIGHT
"[F]reedom to travel throughout the United States has long
been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution."44 This
constitutional right to travel was first recognized in Crandall v.
Rule 10.2.1(c) Nevada,45 in which the state of Nevada levied a tax
of $1.00 on all passengers46 leaving the state.47 The Supreme
Court found that there did indeed exist a constitutional right to
travel, and the tax was struck down.48 The Court observed:
[I] t may be said that a tax of one dollar for passing through the
State of Nevada, by stage coach or by railroad, cannot sensibly
affect any function of the government, or deprive a citizen of any
valuable right. But if the State can tax a railroad passenger one
dollar, it can tax him one thousand dollars. If one State can do
this, so can every other State. And thus one or more States cover-
ing the only practicable routes of travel from the east to the west,
or from the north to the south, may totally prevent or seriously
burden all transportation of passengers from one part of the
country to the other.49
The Court later noted the "large social values" of the freedom
to travel:
Foreign correspondents and lecturers on public affairs need first-
hand information. Scientists and scholars gain greatly from con-
sultations with colleagues in other countries. Students equip
themselves for more fruitful careers in the United States by in-
struction in foreign universities. Then there are reasons close to
the core of personal life - marriage, reuniting families, spending
hours with old friends. Finally, travel abroad enables American
citizens to understand that people like themselves live in Europe
44 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966); see also Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969) (noting that the Constitution does not explicitly
mention the right to travel because such "a right so elementary was conceived
from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the
Constitution created."); Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1029 (5th Cir. 1991)
("Although no clause in the Constitution specifically provides a right to interstate
travel, the Supreme Court has inferred this right from various constitutional pro-
visions and from the structure of the federal system itself."); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116, 125 (1958) ("The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the
citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment.").
45 73 U.S. 35 (1867).
46 Stagecoach and railroad passengers. See id. at 46.
47 See id.
48 See id. at 44-45.
49 Id. at 46.
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and helps them to be well-informed on public issues. An Ameri-
can who has crossed the ocean is not obliged to form his opin-
ions about our foreign policy merely from what he is told by
officials of our government or by a few correspondents of Ameri-
can newspapers. Moreover, his views on domestic questions are
enriched by seeing how foreigners are trying to solve similar
problems. In many different ways direct contact with other coun-
tries contributes to sounder decisions at home."
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Zemel v. Rusk, further stated the
importance of the right to travel:
The right to know, to converse with others, to consult with them,
to observe social, physical, political and other phenomena
abroad as well as at home gives meaning and substance to free-
dom of expression and freedom of the press . . . The ability to
understand this pluralistic world, filled with clashing ideologies,
is a prerequisite of citizenship if we and the other peoples of the
world are to avoid the nuclear holocaust."'
B. IMPLICATING THE RIGHT
"A... law implicates the right to travel when it actually deters
such travel, [or] when impeding travel is its primary objective
.. A law that does implicate the right to travel is subject to
strict scrutiny by the courts. 5' A compelling state interest must
be shown in order to justify laws that burden the right to
travel.54 And even if there is a legitimate and substantial govern-
mental purpose, "that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can
be more narrowly achieved. 5
5
1. Are Bans Sufficiently Restrictive?
The issue thus turns on whether passenger bans are instituted
with the objective of impeding travel or if deterrence of travel
results. Case law lends little directly in this area, but there are
several circuit cases that address this issue indirectly.
The Fifth Circuit has held that "[m]inor restrictions on travel
simply do not amount to the denial of a fundamental right
Kent v. DtIlles, 357 U.S. at 126-27 (citation omitted).
381 U.S. 1, 24 (DouglasJ., dissenting) (emphasis added).
52 Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 (1986).
51 ,See id.
54 See id. at 905, n4.
,5 Shelton v. Ttucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
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.... , In Cramer, however, the court was taking on the issue of
flight restrictions at Love Field under the Wright Amendment.57
The court looked at whether the restrictions deterred passen-
gers from travelling by air.58 The focus of the court was the lan-
guage of Soto-Lopez.59 The court stated that the statute's history6"
showed that its purpose was not to impede travel but rather to
carry out an agreement between neighboring cities, Dallas and
Fort Worth. 6' Since the restrictions did not actually impede
travel, due to the availability of another airport nearby6 2 and the
ability of the passenger to travel anywhere from Love Field by
taking a second flight, the court held that there was no infringe-
ment on the right to travel.63 The court specifically noted that
the restriction did not deter the passenger from traveling by air,
but instead merely restricted the distance a passenger could fly
from one particular airport.64 The court stated that "[i]f every
infringement on interstate travel violates the traveler's funda-
mental constitutional rights, any governmental act that limits
the ability to travel interstate, such as placing a traffic light
before an interstate bridge, would raise a constitutional issue." 5
The court continued here contrasting minor restrictions from
major restrictions. A complete ban on air travel would most def-
initely be a major restriction in the court's eyes, and thus be
subject to constitutional attack. One could make a strong argu-
ment that the court implied that a restriction that completely
barred travel by air would violate the right to travel.
56 Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1031 (5th Cir. 1991).
57 Id. The amendment "prohibits airlines from offering single ticket interstate
service from Love Field except to the four states contiguous to Texas . I..." d. at
1023. Passengers departing from Love Field who want to continue on outside of
that area must purchase a separate ticket and change planes, and they are not
allowed to check baggage for the entire journey. See id.
58 See id. at 1031.
59 See id.
S.e., the legislative history of the Wright Amendment, or the "Love Field
amendment," as the court refers to it.
61 "The Love Field amendment carries out the agreement between Dallas and
Fort Worth that ended the competition between those cities for the area's princi-
pal airport." Cramer, 931 F.2d at 1031. The court continued: "Congress enacted
the Love Field amendment incident to its legitimate regulation of interstate air-
line service and pursuant to its rational decision to maintain the agreement be-
tween Dallas and Fort Worth." Id. at 1032.
62 Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW), which is 18 miles from the
center of Dallas and only 12 miles from Love Field. See Cramer, 931 F.2d at 1023.
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Another Fifth Circuit case contains language that might be
used against an argument that a ban on passengers would be a
violation of the constitutional right to travel. In City of Houston
v. FAA the court stated that there is no constitutional right to
the most convenient form of travel."' That statement, however,
was made in the context of a claim regarding a perimeter rule
from a certain airport (similar to the Wright Amendment re-
strictions on Love Field)."7 A complete ban on air travel is obvi-
ously much more prohibitive than the restrictions discussed in
these cases. The Fifth Circuit would apparently agree, conced-
ing that a ban on using a particular airport "might well give rise
to a constitutional claim.""8
The District of Columbia Circuit considered the Wright
Amendment issue, too, and reached the same conclusion.'1 In a
case that was "virtually identical"7 to Cramer, that circuit, as the
Fifth had, relied on the language of Soto-Lopez, examining the
statute at issue and looking to see if its primary objective was to
impede travel or if it actually deterred travel. 71 This court found
that the purpose of the Wright Amendment was actually to en-
courage interstate travel by channeling passengers through the
new airport, DFW.72 As to whether the Wright Amendment ac-
tually deterred travel, the court found any interference, which
the court described as having to drive six more miles past Love
Field to DFW, to be merely "trivial. ''17 Again, though, that in-
convenience is quite trivial, and incomparable to the situation in
which a passenger is banned from all air travel.
The Ninth Circuit recently had occasion to visit the right to
travel issue in Miller v. Reed.74 That case dealt with an individual
who had been denied a driver's license by the state of California
66 679 F.2d 1184, 1198 (5th Cir. 1982).
67 The rule at issue in this case prohibited nonstop flights between Washington
National Airport and any other airport more than 1000 miles away. See id. at
1187. When the court held that there is no right to the most convenient form of
travel, it was speaking of the inconvenience of either using another airport in the
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area (such as Dulles) or by using National Air-
port but having to make a stopover rather than flying nonstop. See id.
68 Id. at 1192.
69 See Kansas v. United States, 16 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
70 Id. at 439.
71 See id. at 441.
72 See id. at 441-42.
7-1 1I. at 442.
74 176 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 1999).
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and claimed that that the denial violated his right to travel.75
This court also focused on the language of Soto-Lopez, and found
that the primary objective of requiring a driver's social security
number was not to impede interstate travel.76 Instead, the plain-
tiff argued that denying him a driver's license deprived him of
an essential mode of transportation.77 The court, relying on
Ninth Circuit precedent, 78 held that "burdens on a single mode
of transportation do not implicate the right to interstate
travel. '79 Its holding should be construed narrowly, though,
since it also quoted a Supreme Court of Rhode Island case
which differentiated denial of a driver's license from being "pre-
vented from traveling ... by common carrier."8 In the case of
an individual being banned from an airline or from all air travel,
common carrier implications do come into play. This differenti-
ation by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island and the Ninth Cir-
cuit suggest that bans on travel by common carriers would
involve right to travel issues. See Section V, infra, for a discus-
sion of the duties of common carriers. Also, "[t]he reality of
modern life is such that air travel is often the only viable means
of travel, '"' so one might argue that banning a single form of
75 See id. Miller refused to supply his social security number on his driver's
license renewal form, as required inder California law. See id. at 1204. His re-
fusal was based on his religious beliefs. See id.
76 See id. at 1205. The purpose of the statute was "to aid the state in the identi-
fication and collection of child support obligations, tax obligations, and delin-
quent fines, bail, or parking penalties." Id. at 1204. The court noted that Miller
had no children and had no outstanding child support obligations, taxes, fines,
bail, or parking penalties, thus dismissing the possibility that his refusal to pro-
vide his social security number was somehow related to his trying to evade one of
the enumerated obligations. See id. at 1204.
77 See 176 F.3d at 1205.
78 See Monarch Travel Servs. Inc. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc., 466 F.2d
552, 554 (9th Cir. 1972). Miller quotes this case: "A rich man can choose to drive
a limousine; a poor man may have to walk. The poor man's lack of choice in his
mode of travel may be unfortunate, but it is not unconstitutional." 176 F.3d at
1205-06. That case, though, dealt with the issue of cost and affordability. It did
not consider industry or government sanctioned bans on travel.
79 Miller, 176 F.3d at 1205. The court also cited the City of Houston v. FAA case
discussed and distinguished above. See id. at 1206. Although this court mentions
the right to interstate travel, there is a recognized right to intrastate travel as well.
See generally Gregory J. Mode, Comment, Wisconsin, A Constitutional Right to Intra-
state Travel, and Anti-Cruising Ordinances, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 735 (1995) (discussing
how the right has been addressed by the Supreme Court and the split among the
circuit courts).
80 Id. at 1206 (quoting Berberian v. Petit, 374 A.2d 791 (1977)).
81 Katherine Warner, Comment, You Can't Get There From Here: Travel Restric-
tions and the Airlines, 58J. AIR L. & Com. 345, 348 (1992).
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travel, namely air travel, does constitute a sufficient impediment
on the right to travel.
It is important to remember the language, excerpted above,
used by the Court in Crandall: "one or more States covering the
only practicable routes of travel from the east to the west, or from
the north to the south, may totally prevent or seriously burden all
transportation of passengers ....,,2 One could most definitely
make a strong case that in today's lightening-quick world, air
transportation is the only "practicable" route of travel if one is to
actively participate in society. One could similarly conclude that
a ban on air travel "seriously burdens" transportation to passen-
gers against whom a ban is enforced. Significant precedent ex-
ists, it would seem, to support this argument.
Using the standard established by the line of cases just dis-
cussed, it appears that passenger bans would rise to the level
required by the courts. An outright ban on passengers is obvi-
ously imposed with the objective of impeding travel, and it in
fact does deter travel for those passengers who have received a
ban. Thus, banning passengers from air travel seems to impli-
cate the Constitution.
2. Are Airlines State Actors?
The nature of any ban, or more precisely, who imposes a ban
on a passenger, may affect its constitutionality. Specifically, for
constitutional claims to stand, the illegal action must be taken
by a state actor or "under color of state law." 3
The question, then, would be whether airlines, in imposing or
enforcing bans on passengers, could be considered state actors.
According to the Supreme Court, "there is 'state action' when-
ever the 'State has so far insinuated itself into a position of inter-
dependence [with the otherwise "private" person whose
conduct is allegedly violative of a constitutional provision] ...
Crandall, 73 U.S. at 46 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). The Court in Guest held that to constitute state ac-
tion, "the involvement of the State need [not] be either exclusive or direct. In a
variety of situations the Court has found state action of a nature sufficient to
create rights tinder the [Constitution] even though the participation of the State
was peripheral, or its action was only one of several co-operative forces leading to
the constitutional violation." Id. at 755-56.
870
ALL THE (AIR) RAGE
that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the chal-
lenged activity.""4
The Ninth Circuit has held that a search by an airline em-
ployee pursuant to government regulations is performed under
color of state law. In United States v. Davis, a TWA employee
found a loaded revolver in a passenger's baggage while con-
ducting a search of carry-on baggage. 5 The court held "that the
United States was sufficiently implicated in this airport screen-
ing search . ...,"' The court stated:
The search . . .was part of a nationwide anti-hijacking program
conceived, directed, and implemented by federal officials in co-
operation with air carriers. The major governmental effort to
meet the threat of hijacking began in late 1968, when hijacking
of commercial aircraft reached serious proportions, and intensi-
fied steadily thereafter. Various techniques ... have been a part
of that effort. At no time since late 1968 could activities of this kind at
the nation's airports have been described accurately as "an independent
investigation by the carrier for its own purposes ....
The federal statute that allows airlines to refuse to transport
passengers8 was one of these "various techniques" employed as
part of the anti-hijacking effort and, thus, by the words of the
Davis court, involves the government as well. As the court
stated,
[E]ven if the governmental involvement.., could be character-
ized accurately as mere "encouragement" or as "peripheral, or
• ..one of several cooperative forces leading to the [alleged]
constitutional violation," that involvement would nevertheless be
"significant" for [constitutional] purposes. Constitutional limita-
tions on governmental action would be severely undercut if the
government were allowed to actively encourage conduct by "pri-
8 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794-95 n.7 (1966) (citation omitted).
As will be seen in the cases presented below, state action also encompasses fed-
eral action. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 897 n.3 (9th Cir. 1973)
("The government has suggested no reason why the rules applied in distinguish-
ing private action from action by a state under the Fourteenth Amendment
should not also be applicable in distinguishing private action from action by the
United States ...."). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504
(1978) ("[It would be] untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity
law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought
directly under the Constitution against federal officials.").
35 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
86 Id. at 895.
87 Id. at 897 (emphasis added).
- See 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b).
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vate" persons or entities that is prohibited to the government
itself.89
Another Ninth Circuit opinion issued shortly thereafter clari-
fied the reasoning in Davis: "[S]ince the search was conducted
as part of the [airline security program]" it involved state ac-
tion. 90 The search of a passenger's bag by an airline employee
in that case was held not to be under color of state law because
the employee was not inspecting the bag pursuant to the air-
line's inspection procedure but rather to satisfy his own curios-
ity.91 Presumably, then, if the airline employee had been
inspecting the bag pursuant to airline procedure, which is regu-
lated by the FAA, he would have been acting under color of
state law. As discussed in Section III, infra, an airline's denial of
passage to an individual is governed by FAA regulations as well,
so any action by the airlines in this area implicitly involves the
government. 92 The significance of this regulation by the federal
government was noted by the Supreme Court: "Planes do not
wander about in the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only by
federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hands of
federally certified personnel and under an intricate system of
federal commands." '
A more recent Ninth Circuit case may be more telling: "it] he
government policy doesn't have to be formal, but it does have to
compel the challenged action."94 What constitutes compulsion
then, may become very important. In this Ninth Circuit case,
Mathis, an employee of a contractor at a nuclear power plant
was barred from the plant after an undercover agent of the
power plant reported that Mathis had agreed to sell marijuana.9 5
89 Davis, 482 F.2d at 904 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-756 (1966)).
90 United States v. Ogden, 485 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1973).
91 See id. at 539.
92 The involvement of the federal government in the actions of airlines has
been recognized by the courts: "Congress intended boarding procedures-in-
cluding the decision to eject passengers during boarding-to remain the prov-
ince of the agency regulating interstate carriers." Hirsch v. American Airlines,
608 N.Y.S.2d 606, 608 (1993) (citing O'Carroll v. American Airlines, 863 F.2d 11,
12-13 (5th Cir. 1989)). This states, explicitly, that the federal government is in
control of the situation, and any action by an airline is through the authority and
supervision of the FAA.
93 Schaeffer v. Cavallero, 29 F. Supp. 2d 184, 186 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting
Northwest Airlines Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
94 Mathis v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 75 F.3d 498, 503 n.2 (9th Cir. 1996).
95 Id. at 501.
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The power plant was a private entity, but Mathis claimed that "its
acts were imbued with governmental authority" because, inter
alia, it acted under the policies of the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission (NRC), a public agency. 6 The court held that to prove
federal action Mathis would need to show that the power plant
barred him pursuant to an NRC "standard of decision for the
exclusion of illegal drug users from protected areas,"' 7 as op-
posed to merely showing that the power plant "was aware of a
generalized federal concern with drug use at nuclear power
plants ...."98
Certainly airlines, in banning passengers pursuant to the cur-
rent law, are basing their decisions on "a standard of decision"
promulgated by the government; the Federal Aviation Act
(FAA) specifically spells out when a passenger may be ex-
cluded. 9u And the proposed legislation discussed in Section II,
supra, providing for a federal ban of passengers and fines for any
airline that provides transportation to a banned passenger,
would undeniably be acting under compulsion of the federal
government under any definition of compulsion.
A district court from Colorado has also spoken on the com-
pulsion issue.' The court in United States v. Andrews held, in a
search context, that an airline must be under "statutory compul-
sion" in order for "the requisite governmental participation nec-
essary to invoke constitutional protection" to be present."" The
relevant regulatory statute in this area is 49 U.S.C. § 44902, aptly
titled "Refusal to transport passengers and property."1"2 That
section of the statute sets out when an airline either must or may
refuse service to a passenger. Certain instances require an air-
line to refuse to transport a person, but denying transport to a
previously unruly passenger falls under the "permissive" portion
of the statute, meaning that an airline is not required to refuse
to transport but may choose to do so.Il"" Thus, the FAA and the
airlines will probably claim that banning unruly passengers is
97 Id. at 502 (quoting Mathis v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 891 F.2d 1429, 1434
(9th Cir. 1989)).
-8 Id.
99 See Section IV, infra, for discussion of the Federal Aviation Act and the stan-
dard it sets out for allowing an airline to refuse to provide transportation to a
passenger.
100 See United States v. Andrews, 474 F. Supp. 456 (D. Colo. 1979).
lo, Id. at 460.
02 49 U.S.C. § 44902 (1994).
103 Id.
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not compelled by FAA regulations," 4 but rather the airlines' de-
sire, and in fact, need, to ensure the safety of their passengers
and flights. Again though, as noted above, the parameters of
what constitutes compulsion thus becomes very important in as-
sessing whether the requisite federal action is present.
It is important to note that in Andrews the court was speaking
in the specific context of a search engaged in by an airline as a
"unilateral desire to aid in the enforcement of the law" by look-
ing for narcotics. ""s The court was differentiating from the situ-
ation where the airline was engaging in a search under the
security program of the Federal Aviation Administration. '""
Thus, the reasoning of the court in this case would likely not be
applicable in a situation where an airline refuses transportation
to a passenger for safety reasons, which is a direct interest of the
FAA. 17
The Ninth Circuit in Mathis mentioned another way of estab-
lishing state action."' The joint action theory attributes to the
state actions of private persons who are willful participants in
joint action with state officials. "A private person is liable under
this theory ... only if the particular actions challenged are inex-
tricably intertwined with those of the government."'" To show
this in an airline situation, a passenger would have to show that
the airline's "official character is such as to lend the weight of
the State to his decisions."'") A passenger might be able to show
state action under this theory by focusing on the purpose and
effect of teh implementation of the statute that allows airlines to
refuse to transport passengers in certain instances, and showing
how the FAA and the airlines work together to achieve this
result.
'04 Under the current law. If the proposed legislation referred to in Section II,
supra, is passed, the banning of unruly passengers would not be permissive; it
would be mandatory.
105 Andrews, 474 F. Supp. at 461 (citation omitted).
106 See id.
1',7 See Section IV, infra, for further disctIssion of the statutory responsibilities
of airlines.
1(i1 75 F.3d at 503.
1 Id. (citation omitted).
'10 Id. at 504 n.3 (qloting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937). The passenger essentially
would need to show that the airline was 'jointly engaged with state officials in the
prohibited action." /d. at 504 n.4 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787,
794 (1966)).
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The District of Columbia Circuit has held that an airline "is
not transformed into a government actor by regulation." ' '
That case, Anderson, dealt with a seating policy of USAir (and
specifically not an FAA policy), which forbade blind passengers
from sitting in an emergency exit row. ' 2 The court actually
gave the issue little consideration and summarized, "USAir has
not undertaken to perform a service for the government or en-
tered into a symbiotic relationship with the government. The
requisite interdependence is not reached here."'' 3
It is important to note that while the court did not find action
taken under color of state law in Anderson, it focused solely on
the airline's seating policy and whether it derived from federal
involvement in the airline industry. The court noted that since
the blind passenger was only refused service in two of twenty-two
seats on the aircraft, his right to travel was not violated.' 4 One
could argue that the court implies, then, that if the passenger
had been denied travel altogether, there would have been a vio-
lation of that right. This may go to show the restrictiveness that
the court sees in outright bans, as discussed above.
Going back to the government compulsion that both Mathis
and Andrews spoke of, the Ninth Circuit, albeit in an earlier case,
but perhaps one more similar in principle to the present discus-
sion, held otherwise. In Culbertson v. Leland the court heard a
case dealing with an Arizona statue that allowed innkeepers to
seize, without notice or judicial procedure, the personal prop-
erty of a lodger who doesn't pay rent. ' 5 The case involved a
couple living in a room at a hotel. '"" The couple fell one week
behind on their rent, and the hotel manager evicted them and
seized their personal possessions in the room as security for the
unpaid rent."7 At no time was the manager an official of the
State of Arizona, nor did she ever seek nor receive assistance
from any state officials." 8 The evicted couple challenged the
III Anderson v. USAIR, Inc., 818 F.2d 49, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
112 Id. at 51.
-1 Id. at 56.
114 See id.
1"5 528 F.2d 426, 427 (9th Cir. 1975).
Iw See id.
117 See id.
11S See id. The court did note that a member of the Phoenix police department
informed the hotel manager that she had the right to seize her tenant's personal
property, but the court did not place any importance on this fact. See id.
2000] 875
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
manager's actions on due process grounds.'"' The court fo-
cused on the rights that the actor would have at common law,
specifically noting that the statute conferred a right not nor-
mally available to the hotel manager at common law. 121 Simi-
larly, common carriers under the common law had a duty to
provide transportation to those who presented themselves.' 2 '
The court in Culbertson held that the hotel manager's actions
constituted state action and was a violation of the guests' due
process. 
22
While the above discussion demonstrates that there might be
some question as to bans instituted by airlines, government-sanc-
tioned bans would be considered state action and thus subject to
constitutional claims. For instance, even if airlines would not be
considered as acting under color of state law due to the "permis-
sive" refusal aspect of denying passage to persons whom the air-
lines feel might be "inimical to safety,"' 12 1 the actions by the
Secretary of Transportation to institute a one-year ban on un-
ruly passengers would most certainly implicate constitutional
concerns, since the government would then be directly and irre-
futably involved in the action.' 24 This might be an important
point for the airline industry and the Department of Transporta-
tion to consider when crafting their strategy on how to imple-
ment bans.
It is worthwhile to note that even if state action is found,
courts may still defer to governmental interests in cases dealing
with safety on flights. In a criminal case, the Fifth Circuit re-
-, See Culbertson, 528 F.2d at 428. See Subsection 3, infra, for a discussion of
procedural due process.
121, See id. at 429.
121 See Section V, infra for a discussion of the duties of a common carrier.
122 See Culbertson, 528 F.2d at 432; see also Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir.
1970) (holding that a Texas landlord's lien statute which gave the authority that
was normally a function of the state (or, as in our discussion, the FAA-keeping
the skies safe from hijackers and other malcontents did constitute state action)).
The Hall court held that a landlady seizing a television set in order to satisfy her
claim for unpaid rent was indistinguishable from that of executing a judgment,
which was normally reserved for government officials. As such, her actions con-
stituted state action. See id. at 438-440. Cf Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201 (1st
Cir. 1975).
2 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b).
12, For instance, in Davis the Ninth Circuit found that the institution of secur-
ity measures in airports involved the FAA and the airlines working together to put
the security measures into operation, and as such, sufficient governmental in-
volvement was present, even if the security measures were actually undertaken
solely by airline personnel. 482 F.2d at 899.
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jected a First Amendment freedom of speech defense in a case
where the defendants refused to turn off their "boombox," even
after being instructed by the airline crew to turn it off because it
might interfere with the navigational system of the aircraft. 125
The court, using the familiar "yelling fire in a theater" analogy,
upheld limitations on the speech as permissible, '26 due to safety
considerations. This may not be a very close case, conceptually
speaking, with outright bans on passengers, though, as this in-
fringement on passenger rights was rationalized in the name of
immediate safety concerns, while outright bans may not be as
easily linked to similar concerns.
3. Procedural Due Process Concerns
If it can be established that the constitutional right to travel is
implicated in the situation where passengers are banned from
air travel 127 and that there is sufficient state action, a passenger
must receive procedural due process before he or she can be
deprived of that right. A similarity can be drawn between the
blacklisting of unruly passengers and the infliction of additional
punishment on criminals who fall under certain classifications
due to their crimes. The similarity is in the procedural due pro-
cess concerns of each.
In Pennsylvania v. Williams, a convicted child molester chal-
lenged the state's sexual predator law, which exacted "enhanced
punishment of sexually violent predators."' 128 The issue in that
case was whether the method by which offenders were desig-
nated as sexually violent predators was constitutional.' 29 The
challenged law required persons convicted of certain offenses to
go before a review board, which would determine if the of-
fender was a sexually violent predator."' The presumption was
that the offender was a sexual violent predator; the burden was
on him to rebut the presumption with clear and convincing evi-
dence.' 3' The court in Williams noted:
[T]he determination of whether one is a sexually violent
predator is a separate factual question that commences following
an offender's conviction of one of the specified [predicate] of-
125 See United States v. Hicks, 980 F.2d 963, 965 (5th Cir. 1992).
126 See id. at 971.
127 I.e., a constitutional right has been established.
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fenses .... Specifically, the court is faced with factually deter-
mining whether the convicted offender is a person who [fits the
definition of asexually violent predator: one who] "due to a
mental abnormality or personality disorder is likely to engage in
predatory sexually violent offenses."" 2
Because the issue of classifying an offender as a sexually vio-
lent predator was a separate factual one than that of the under-
lying offense, leading to additional punishment, and the burden
on that issue was on the offender, the court found that the of-
fender was not afforded due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment and struck down the law.'3 3
This is comparable to the blacklisted passenger situation,
where an airline or the federal government might attempt to
ban a passenger from flying for a year, or flying ever again,
based on an incident in the past, which may or may not have
involved criminal charges, and without giving the passenger so
much as a hearing on the matter. In essence, the airline or the
federal government would be making a determination as to
whether the passenger "is, or might be, inimical to safety"'"4 in
the future. This would clearly be a separate factual issue than
that of the passenger being unruly in one past incident. So it
would appear that an airline or the federal government, by plac-
ing the passenger on a blacklist and refusing to serve that pas-
senger in the future (i.e., inflicting additional punishment)
without some sort of hearing where the party implementing the
ban has the burden of persuasion, would violate the due process
requirements to which these passengers are constitutionally
entitled.3 15
4. Are Bans Too Broad Of A Remedy?
Even if it were found that bans serve a legitimate and substan-
tial government purpose, "that purpose cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when
132 Id. at 601.
13 See id. at 608; see also Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); E.B. v.
Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that a sex offender registration
law inflicting additional punishment and placing the burden of persuiasion on
the offender violated the due process requirements of the registrant).
114 49 U.S.C. § 44902. See liscussion at Section IV, infra regarding this word-
ing, which refers to the circumstances in which an airline may refuse service to a
passenger under federal law.
135 See notes 116-21, supra and accompanying text discussing the Culberftson
case, which expressed due process concerns (the case is disctussed above in a state
action context, but it is relevant here as well for its duLe process considerations).
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the end can be more narrowly achieved."'3 6 The bans must not
invade the area of protected freedoms by sweeping too broadly
unnecessarily.11 7 This means that the courts should look to see
if any there are any "less drastic"' 8 means of achieving the ob-
jective of the bans."3 9 Since these bans are only in their infant
stages and only a few have been implemented so far, perhaps
this exercise would serve the airlines as well: they could find a
more effective solution that might not be subject to being over-
turned by the courts and still provide them with the safety assur-
ance that they seem to be looking for. Additionally, as Congress
considers the proposed legislation discussed above, it must also
consider whether "less drastic" means exist, lest the legislation
be thrown out once it reaches the courts.
IV. REGULATION BY THE FAA
Besides constitutional questions regarding bans on passen-
gers, airlines are regulated by the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA), so questions arise based on that regulation by the
FAA as to an airline's ability to refuse service to a passenger.
Kent v. Dulles states that the "[f]lreedom to travel is, indeed, an
important aspect of the citizen's 'liberty.' "140 "If that 'liberty' is
to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the law-making functions
of the Congress. And if that power is delegated," that delegated
power should be construed narrowly.' 4 ' As noted above, the
federal government has dictated when an airline may or must
refuse service to a passenger.14 2 Specifically, an airline "may re-
fuse to transport a passenger ... the carrier decides is, or might
be, inimical to safety."''
43
136 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964) (quoting Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
137 See NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
13' Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 512.
139 Assuming, of course, that the objectives of the bans are found to be
constitutional.
1,( 357 U.S. at 127.
141 Id. at 129 (citations omitted).
1,12 "Refusing to let ticketed passengers board a plane when others in the same
situation are allowed transportation clearly denies access to the 'public right of
freedom of transit' through navigable airspace and contravenes the statutory pur-
poses of the Federal Aviation Act." Mason v. Belieu, 543 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (citation omitted) (speaking in the context of a section of the FAA which
prohibits treating passengers differently from one another).
",!' 49 U.S.C. § 44902.
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That phrase has been the subject of much litigation. The
question comes down to how much discretion does an airline
have?
A. AN AIRLINE'S DISCRETION
While the discretion given to airlines in refusing transporta-
tion to a passenger for safety reasons is "decidedly expansive, it
is not unfettered."' 44 And if an airline's refusal of transportation
is "arbitrary and capricious," the refusal can give rise to a claim
by the offended passenger for damages."'4 The Fourth Circuit
discussed the discretion given to airlines:
Air travel in modern society presents formidable safety and secur-
ity concerns and often passengers with criminal intentions are
the source of that threat. Federal law - in conjunction with its
broad preemption of state-law claims related to airlines' services -
appropriately grants airlines latitude in making decisions neces-
sary to safeguard passengers from potential security threats.4
In one of the few cases to actually deal with a situation involv-
ing unruly passengers, two intoxicated passengers were loud and
boisterous, asking the flight attendant for liquor immediately af-
ter boarding and telling the pilot that he would help him fly the
plane.'47 The passengers also used obscene language. When an
irregularity was found regarding their tickets, the passengers re-
fused to leave the plane. The passengers were finally forced to
deplane and were charged with disorderly conduct and taken
into police custody. At trial, the jury awarded one of the passen-
gers over a quarter of a million dollars in damages."' The Fifth
Circuit vacated that judgment, however, since the passenger
only sued the airline for state law claims. The court ruled that
state law claims in this area are preempted by the Airline Der-
egulation Act.'49
Another case, from the Fourth Circuit, was also dismissed at
the summary judgment level due to preemption. '5' That case
'44 O'Carroll v. American Airlines, 863 F.2d 11, 12 (5th Cir. 1989).
,,5 Schaeffer v. Cavallero, 54 F. Supp. 2d 350, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
1'w Smith v. Comair, 134 F.3d 254, 258 (4th Cir. 1998).
1,7 See O'Carroll, 863 F.3d at 12.
14 See id.
14, See id. at 12-14. The Airline Deregulation Act prohibits states fiom "en-
act[ing] or enforc[ing] a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and
effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier." 49 U.S.C.
§ 41713(b) (1).
1-51, See Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1998).
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involved a man denied transportation because he breached se-
curity measures by the airline. The court held that "airlines'
boarding practices" are an "area of unique federal concern."' 1
Many other courts have held, however, that outrageous behavior
by airlines in removing a passenger can subject the airlines to
state law claims (thus, state law claims not preempted by the
FAA).' 52
In another case, Cordero v. CIA Mexicana De Aviacion, S.A., 15' a
passenger became loud and directed insults toward the pilot
when the airplane made an unscheduled stop to pick up addi-
tional passengers.' 54 At the unscheduled stop, airline ground
personnel informed a passenger, who protested his innocence
and stated that the crew had identified the wrong passenger,
that he would not be allowed to continue on the flight due to
his insulting the pilot and crew. 1 5 The passenger sued. The
jury in Cordero found for the plaintiff, but the district court en-
tered ajudgment notwithstanding the verdict.' 5 The Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed and reinstated the jury verdict. 57 The court found
that although the statute
empowers an air carrier to refuse passage, we do not think that it
renders immune from liability a carrier whose decision to deny
passage is unreasonably or irrationally formed. While . . . air
safety is a paramount concern of air carriers and of the public
generally, we do not believe that requiring carriers to act reason-
ably in formulating opinions to deny passage undercuts this
concern.158
The court noted a Second Circuit decision that set out a test to
determine the reasonableness of an airline's decision:
151 Id. at 258-59.
152 See Peterson v. Continental Airlines, 970 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Even
the Smith court held that if a passenger were detained without some safety or
security justification, a claim against the offending airline would not be pre-
empted. 134 F.3d at 259.
153 681 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1982).
154 See id. at 670.
155 See id. At trial, a flight attendant testified that upon deplaning, the passen-
ger had uttered an obscenity and raised his arm in a threatening way toward her.
See id. at 671. The passenger presented the testimony of another passenger who




158 d. at 671.
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The test of whether or not the airline properly exercised its
power under [49 U.S.C. § 44902] to refuse passage to an appli-
cant or ticketholder rests upon the facts and circumstances of the
case as known to the airline at the time it formed its opinion and
made its decision and whether or not the opinion and decision
were rational and reasonable in the light of those facts and cir-
cumstances. They are not to be tested by other facts later dis-
closed by hindsight. 5 '1
The Cordero court concluded its description of the reasonable-
ness test as follows:
The reasonableness of the carrier's opinion ... is to be tested on
the information available to the airline at the moment a decision
is required. There is correspondingly no duty to conduct an in-
depth investigation into a ticket-holder's potentially dangerous
proclivities. We believe this facet of the test provides a reasona-
ble balance between safety concerns and the right[s] of
passengers. "'
This test, of course, just makes everything hazier.
B. WiiAT IS REASONABLE?" "'
In Schaeffer, a flight attendant informed a passenger that he
was not allowed to bring on two pieces of carry-on luggage.'" 2
The passenger, an attorney, "vigorously protested, asserting his
alleged knowledge of airline regulations and procedures.'""
The passenger finally relented and turned over one bag, but
1 Id. at 672 (citing Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 509 F.2d 942 (2d Cir.
1975)).
I' Cordero, 681 F.2d at 672. I would argue, though, that some courts have gone
too far with this discretion afforded to airlines. For instance, the court in Adam-
sons v. American Airlines, 444 N.E.2d 21 (N.Y. 1982), ruled that an airline had not
abused its discretion when it refused transportation to a passenger who looked
physically ill and was in a wheelchair. The airline did not even bother to investi-
gate the matter to see if safety might be a concern. See id. at 47-49. Instead it
made its decision to refuse transportation based on appearances. See id. The
court ruled that this was not abusive, that an airline is protected as long as it
exercises "good faith." Id. at 47. But is there really good faith if an airline won't
even look into a matter? And airlines will be opening a legal can of worms if they
start basing decisions on appearances.
Ili' Conversely, what is "arbitrary and capricious?" See supra text accompanying
note 110. "Arbitrary and capricious" is defined as "willftl and unreasonable
action without consideration or in disregard of facts .... ." Bic:'s LAw
Dic-IIONARv 105 (6th Ed. 1990). Of course, classifying something as reasonable if
it is not arbitrary and capricious in effect, then, means that something is
reasonable if it is not unreasonable.
i62 54 F. Stipp. 2d 350, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
1,Id.
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when he did not receive a receipt for the bag, he "so vocifer-
ously pursued his demand for the receipt" that he was asked to
deplane. 6 4 He refused to leave the plane and had to be physi-
cally removed by the police.""6 While the case settled during
trial, "'66 the trial court, in denying summary judgment, stated
that sufficient evidence existed that the airline, in violation of
§ 44902, made its
decision to remove him simply [to] retaliat[e] for his verbal pro-
testation. While an airline enjoys broad discretion in deciding
whether to refuse passage, the decision to exclude a vociferous
but peaceful passenger who limits himself to complaining of the
airline's treatment may in some circumstances constitute an
abuse of that discretion.16 7
In fact, in a clarifying ruling after the trial,16 the court held
that the passenger had presented no evidence of a retaliatory
motive on the airline's part. 6" The court did note, however, in
denying the defendant's motion forjudgment as a matter of law,
that an airline would be acting in an arbitrary and capricious
manner, again, in violation of § 44902, if it based its decision
that a passenger might be a safety risk purely on his raising his
voice and being "generally quarrelsome."1 70 The court, while ac-
knowledging the discretion given to airlines in this area, held
that:
to say that any time an impolite or unpleasant passenger debates
a non-safety issue with an airline employee in a boisterous or abu-
sive manner he automatically poses a potential threat to safety
would be in effect to set no meaningful limits to the carrier's
exercise of its discretion and thus to eliminate the statutory stan-
dard altogether. Where no safety issue is reasonably implicated,
even grouches have a right to gripe without being grounded.' 7
In the Second Circuit case referred to above, Williams, TWA
denied passage on the basis of F.B.I. reports that the ticket-




167 Schaeffer v. Cavallero, 29 F. Supp. 2d 184, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
118 The case settled after the completion of the plaintiff's case at trial. See,
Schaeffer, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 351.
169 See id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 352.
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dangerous. 72 The court held that the airline could reasonably
take the F.B.I. report at face value. 7 ' The court took care to
note that the report relied on was from an official government
police agency.' 74 There was also a concern for immediate safety.
This is quite different from a situation where an airline is relying
on a report from another airline (in the case of an industrywide
ban) or even if the unruly act occurred in the past on that par-
ticular airline.
The Williams court noted that Congress enacted the Federal
Aviation Act to meet the "serious problem" of hijacking. 17 5 But
perhaps this purpose has become outdated, since it now appears
that this "serious problem" is not much of a problem anymore.
Hijackings are on the decline. 7 " In fact, in recent years there
have been no hijacking incidents in any part of North
America. 77 This original purpose of the Federal Aviation Act,
and the uses it is being put to today, should be examined care-
172 Williams, 509 F.2d at 948.
173 See id.
174 Interestingly, in a 1983 case which has received a great deal of attention
from other courts, the discretion the district court gave to the airline was very
broad indeed. See Zervigon v. Peidmont Aviation, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1305
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). In that case, a passenger overheard a group of passengers speak-
ing in Spanish. That passenger thought that the group's comments were a bit
odd, and she told her husband. Her husband told another passenger, and that
passenger told the captain. Like the children's game of telephone, by the time
the comments had been translated into English and then communicated three
levels away, the comments went from "when we get to the capital . . . they [will]
ask us for our experience on this flight" to a comment that the passengers were
going to hijack the plane from New York to Cuba. Id. at 1306-07. In light of a
previous experience on the flight (a flight attendant had been assaulted by a
passenger purportedly with the group of passengers in question) the captain
forced that group to deplane. The court stated that "there can be no doubt that
as a matter of law the captain's decision was reasonable and appropriate." Id. at
1307. The court, in a questionable decision, held that it is not arbitrary and
capricious for the captain to rely on third hand knowledge of a comment made
in a different language. Surely in this type of situation it would not be too much
to ask of the captain and the airline to do a bit of investigation before removing
passengers from a plane.
17-6 1(. at 946; see also United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
176, See Helen Connell, Flight and Fear, From Kitty Hawk to Kandahar, LONDON
FREE PRESS, Dec. 29, 1999, at A12.
177 See Chris Yates, Asia Tops Poor Results, JANE'S AIRPORT REV., July 1, 1998, at
33. This is significant, especially in light of the past. "Between 1961 and 1968,
hijackings of United States aircraft averaged about one per year. In 1968, how-
ever, the number rose to 18. In 1969, there were 40 attempted hijackings of
United States aircraft, 33 successful." Davis, 482 F.2d at 898 (citing McGinley &
Downs, Airy)ort Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable Approach, 41 FORDHLAM L. REV.
293 (1972)).
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fully by the courts when deciding whether an airline has the
right under the FAA to deny passage to an individual.
A federal district court in New York also noted this focus of
the law on hijacking and terrorism.' In that case, a passenger
was observed by the flight crew as acting very nervous, repeat-
edly going to the lavatory, and muttering about the Germans
having killed Jews and his desire to kill Jews. I79 The court noted
that the captain of the plane met with "all available safety per-
sonnel" in order to evaluate the risk. 8"' The captain and the
security personnel then decided to remove the passenger be-
cause they determined that based on the observed conduct, the
passenger likely posed a risk to the flight.I8' The court held that
the fact that later the man was found not to be carrying any
explosives and that his checked baggage was not harmful was
beside the point: the airline acted reasonably in the face of im-
mediate danger. 82
Again though, one can make an argument that this is very
different from the case where a passenger has "misbehaved" in
the past and is forever banned from future flights on that partic-
ular airline, or even on all airlines. How can an airline claim
that one incident, possibly not even criminal, determines the
risk level of a passenger for the rest of his life? This would seem-
ingly be an egregious abuse of discretion.
The whole point here is that the courts are truly all over the
place on what constitutes action by the airlines that falls under
its statutory authority under the FAA allowing the refusal of
transportation to passengers. What some see as reasonable
others see as arbitrary and capricious. But those situations,
which the courts struggle with, all deal with immediate issues of
safety that the airlines must consider. They do not deal with an
airline trying to ban a passenger based on past incidents. It
would definitely seem that if the courts struggle over whether a
passenger is an immediate risk to safety, they would be much
more inclined to see a ban as arbitrary and capricious, and they
would be much more willing to curtail the broad discretion
given to airlines, given the fact that a ban would be handed out
more for punishment purposes rather than due to immediate
safety concerns.
178 See Sedigh v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 197, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
179 See id. at 198.
'so Id. at 202.
1 See id. at 199.
182 See id. at 202.
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V. DUTIES OF A COMMON CARRIER
Notwithstanding the constitutional and federal considerations
discussed above, airlines also fall under the common law'. as
common carriers."8 4 Thus, we need to consider the duties that
common carriers have as such in order to fully analyze the legal
implications of banning passengers from air travel.
The proposition that common carriers have a duty to serve
goes back over 400 years. -' The American courts quickly
adopted the idea as well. Justice Joseph Story stated that a corn-
mon carrier's duty "to carry passengers whenever they offer
themselves and are ready to pay for their transportation ... re-
sults from their setting themselves up, like innkeepers, farriers,
and other carriers, for common public employment."' 8  Ex-
tending this to contract law, "[w] hen the carrier holds itself out
as open to serve the public, it presents an offer that is accepted
the moment a passenger tenders the usual fare, and the contract
is breached if the carrier refuses to serve the passenger." ' 7
The courts have recognized this duty that airlines have as
common carriers. In Austin v. Delta Air Lines, a prospective pas-
',3 The issue of the Airline Deregulation Act, which exempts ailines from state
common law actions in many circumstances, is hotly debated and litigated. It is
also beyond the scope of this comment. Many courts have whittled (town the
impact of and protection afforded by the Airline Deregulation Act, so this discus-
sion of common carrier liability, as well as liability having to do with other areas
of state common law, has increasing relevance. See, e.g., Salley v. TransWorld Air-
lines, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. La. 1989); Newman v. American Airlines, Inc.,
176 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1999).
184 Generally, airlines, which cater to the public and undertake to transport for
hire all persons who present themselves for passage, have been held to be com-
mon carriers. See Annotation, Air Carrier as Common Or Private Carrier, and Result-
ing Duties as to Passenger's Safety, 73 A.L.R.2d 346 (1997). The fact that an airline
may sell a ticket to a passenger that specifically disavows its being a common
carrier has no bearing on the situation. See id.
'11 See Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Pri-
vate Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV\. 1283, 1304 (1996).
1' Id. at 1313 (quoting Joseph Story, COMMENTARIES ON T|E LA.\W Of BAI-
MENTS, WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE CIVIL AND THE FOREIGN LAW (1832)) (stat-
ing that the phrase "common public employment" means holding oneself out as
ready to serve whoever seeks to employ you). In addition, William Jones stated
that the obligation of the common carrier rests on the common law, and not the
fact that the "carrier received a franchise or license from the government." Id. at
1495 n. 97 (citing William Jones, AN ESSA' ON TIlE LAw ohr BAILMENT (1836 edi-
tion) (first ptublished 1781). Thus, this duty of an airline, or other common car-
rier, does not depend on any recognition by the federal government.
187 Id. at 1314. "A common carrier may make what contract he will as to his
compensation; but a tender of his tustial, or of a reasonable compensation,
obliges him to carry ..... Id. (citation omitted).
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senger presented himself at the Delta ticket counter and re-
quested a ticket. 88 He was denied a ticket, being informed that
he was not in proper condition to travel."8 9 Delta defended it-
self by claiming that the plaintiff appeared to be in a condition
in which he would be unable to care for himself in case of emer-
gency.""-() The court in that case recognized the discretion that
airlines have in refusing passage to a prospective passenger.191
The court discussed at length the duty of common carriers. It
quoted an early case from Massachusetts:
A common carrier is bound to care for all who have become its
passengers. For that reason not only is it not bound to accept,
but it is under obligation to refuse to accept as a passenger...
one who because of intoxication or for any other reason would
be offensive to other passengers. '92
Similarly, a New York court in 1831 applied the duty of a com-
mon carrier to railroads: "The public have an interest in the use
of the railroad, and the owners may be prosecuted for the dam-
ages sustained if they should refuse to transport an individual
... without any reasonable excuse ....
The Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky adapted com-
mon carrier liability to airlines early in the development of air
travel.' 94 It noted the differences between air travel and other
forms of travel, and the special considerations demanded relat-
ing to travel by air."1 5 Specifically, the court spoke of "reasona-
ble discretion .. .if exercised in good faith and on reasonable
grounds." 9 ' This, of course, sounds very similar to the language
the courts have adopted in interpreting the Federal Aviation
Act, as noted in Section IV, supra. More recent courts have
made this same observation. In Cordero, the court, in setting out
the reasonableness requirement, noted its consistency with the
common law rule that:
188 246 So. 2d 894 (La. Ct. App. 1971).
1- See id. at 895.
19() See id.
l'!) See id.
192 Id. at 896 (quoting Holton v. Boston Elevated Ry., 21 N.E.2d 251 (1939)).
193 Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. 44, 74-75 (N.Y.
Ch. 1831), quoted in Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommoda-
tions and Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1318-19 (1996).
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where a carrier has reasonable cause to believe and does believe,
that the safety or convenience of its passengers will be endan-
gered by a person who presents himself for transportation, it may
refuse to accept such person for transportation and is not bound
to wait until events have justified its belief.19 7
Similarly, the Second Circuit has held that "[a] common car-
rier such as an airline generally owes its passengers a duty of
reasonable care under the circumstances.""' The court contin-
ued, "This duty requires the common carrier to exercise care
'which a reasonably prudent carrier of passengers would exer-
cise under the same circumstances, in keeping with the dangers
and risks known to the carrier or which it should reasonably
have anticipated.' "')
This duty has been held to be fairly broad. For instance, in
Pittman v. Grayson, the Second Circuit agreed with the district
court, which held that an airline, as a common carrier, had a
duty to transport "anyone who sought passage and was not free
to refuse" to transport passengers even upon receiving an oral
report that a court order prohibited the passengers from leav-
ing.""' It was not reasonable for the airline to rely on an oral
report of a court order-the duty was so strong that it could not
be relieved absent some more "authenticated type of notice."12"'
As noted in Section III, supra, the Ninth Circuit, in a very re-
cent case, explicitly recognized that common carriers arguments
have special considerations. 02 While that court stated that bur-
dens on a single mode of transportation do not raise right to
interstate travel concerns, the court was speaking only in the
context of the right to have a driver's license..2 " : The court dif-
ferentiated the case of a person being prevented from traveling
by common carrier,4 thus implicitly stating that being pre-
vented from the right to interstate travel by common carrier
does implicate the constitutional right to travel.
Also related to the consideration of constitutional issues in
Section 11, the Supreme Court has held that "[m]isuse of
197 Cordero, 681 F.2d at 672 n.3 (quoting 14 AM. JUR. 2D Carriers § 865); Wil-
liams v. Trans World Airlines, 509 F.2d 942, 948 n.10 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting
same).
1" Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1998).
1,, /d. at 18 (citation omitted).
200 149 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 1998).
201 Id. at 123-124.
202 See Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202 (1999).
21" See id. at 1205-06.
204 See id. at 1206.
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power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law,
is action taken 'under color of' state law."2" 5 Tying together Sec-
tions III, IV, and V, supra, one might argue that but for the au-
thority of permissive refusal given by the government to the
airlines,206 airlines would be compelled under their duty as a
common carrier to provide passage to all persons who pay the
required fare. Thus, this power is "made possible only because
the [airline] is clothed with the authority of state law," and it is
therefore performed under the color of state law and must be
analyzed, as discussed in Section III, infra, under a constitutional
light.
VI. CONCLUSION
Security in the air is important to all: passengers, airlines, and
society in general. But airlines and federal and state legislative
bodies must ensure that individual rights are not trampled in
this search for safety. As illustrated above, the constitutional
right to travel must be carefully evaluated when considering the
blacklisting and banning of unruly passengers, especially in light
of the recent involvement of government officials in the ban-
ning effort.
Having established the constitutional right, finding state ac-
tion becomes important. The current statutory authorization al-
lowing airlines to refuse to provide transportation to passengers
likely involves enough action by the government to establish
that the actions taken by airlines in banning a passenger, or de-
veloping a blacklist and banning those on the blacklist, are
taken under the color of state law. Without a doubt, if the pro-
posed legislation currently in Congress, which would provide for
a federally-enforced ban and civil penalties for airlines violating
the bans by providing transportation to banned passengers,
passes, there will be no problem whatsoever, by any test, in find-
ing state action.
If we have a constitutional right and we have state action, we
must be concerned that any person is afforded due process
before that right can be deprived. Certainly unilateral determi-
nations by the airlines, which seem to be occurring presently,
will not suffice. If Congress does pass the proposed legislation,
205 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 325-26 (1941).
206 See 49 U.S.C. § 44902.
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procedural mechanisms must be put into place in order to pro-
tect the rights of passengers.
Beyond that, even without the proposed legislation, airlines,
passengers, and, eventually, courts, must assess the power of the
airlines to ban passengers under the Federal Aviation Act. This
precise issue has not been addressed by the courts, and judging
by the different interpretations taken of the Federal Aviation
Act, it is a good bet that the courts will be all over the place on
the issue of banning passengers from air transportation as well.
This area surely seems to be a future source of much litigation.
All of this should be considered while remembering what air-
lines are at their most basic level: common carriers. That desig-
nation brings with it certain duties and responsibilities that
should not be forgotten just because the industry is so heavily
regulated by the federal government.
Perhaps most important of all, maybe the airlines should look
more closely at the causes of air rage, and instead of reacting to
air rage with bans that would hurt everyone (lowering the reve-
nues of the airlines and the ability of passengers to travel), try to
make the skies safer by taking measures to snuff out air rage
before it starts. 10
7
217 "The best solution to air rage is prevention." Nancy Lee Firak and Kimberly
A. Schmaltz, Air Rage: Choice of Law for Intentional Torts Occurring in Flights Over
International Waters, 63 ALti. L. REV. 1, 15 (1999). Although this may be a state-
ment of the obvious, quite often the obvious is unfortunately overlooked.
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